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  Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Western*
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 07-2871
                           
GUY SCUDERI,
                                      Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                           
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-02213)
District Judge:  The Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway
                           
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2008
                           
Before:  BARRY, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and COHILL,  District Judge*
(Opinion Filed: December 11, 2008)
                           
OPINION
                           
2BARRY, Circuit Judge
Guy Scuderi appeals the District Court’s decision upholding the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”).  We
will affirm.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, we recite only those facts that are relevant to
our analysis.  Scuderi applied for DIB on September 13, 2002, when he was forty-six
years old, alleging disability due to syringomyelia.  Scuderi’s application was initially
denied, and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  On July 29,
2004, the ALJ issued a decision evaluating Scuderi’s claim pursuant to the five-step
sequential analysis in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and denying benefits. The Appeals Council
reversed, however, finding that the ALJ should have obtained updated medical records,
ordered a post-hearing consultative examination in the absence of current records, and
consulted a vocational expert at the hearing.
A second hearing was held before the ALJ, and a vocational expert testified.  On
February 1, 2006, the ALJ again denied benefits, and, on March 17, 2006, the Appeals
Council denied Scuderi’s request for review.  Scuderi appealed to the District Court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  In a detailed opinion examining all of Scuderi’s medical
records and analyzing all of the testimony, the Court found that the Commissioner’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence and upheld the Commissioner’s final
3determination.
Scuderi now argues that the ALJ erred when she: (1) failed to adequately consider
whether Scuderi met Listing 11.19B, (2) failed to explain and identify which evidence
supported and did not support her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding and failed
to consider the effect of Scuderi’s pain in her RFC evaluation, and (3) relied on testimony
from a vocational expert in response to inaccurate and inapplicable hypotheticals.  
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  As did the District Court, we review the ALJ’s
application of law de novo, and we review the ALJ’s factual findings for substantial
evidence.  Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007).   Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).   
III.
A. Step Three: Whether Claimant Meets a Listing of Impairment
Scuderi argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
analysis because she did not specifically identify which Listing she was considering and
did not adequately explain why Scuderi, despite his severe impairment, did not meet any
       Scuderi raised this issue before the Appeals Council after the ALJ’s decision of July2
29, 2004, and argues that the Appeals Council remanded in part because of it.  (See
Appellant’s Br at 29.)  We disagree.  The Appeals Council found that “[i]t seems fairly
clear that the present record does not establish that the listing is met or equaled.” (A-40.) 
It did not hold that the ALJ erred at step three and did not remand on that basis.
4
Listing.   In Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2000), we2
held that an ALJ must provide an explanation of his or her reasoning at step three in order
to allow us to engage in meaningful judicial review.  As the District Court recognized,
however, we also held in Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 502, 505 (3d Cir. 2004), that an ALJ
need not “use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis.”  We stated: 
Rather, the function of Burnett is to ensure that there is sufficient
development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful
review.  In this case, the ALJ’s decision, read as a whole, illustrates that the
ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching the conclusion that [the
claimant] did not meet the requirements for any listing . . . .
Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (internal citation omitted).
Thus, an ALJ need not specifically mention any of the listed impairments in order
to make a judicially reviewable finding, provided that the ALJ’s decision clearly analyzes
and evaluates the relevant medical evidence as it relates to the Listing requirements.  In
this case, Listing 11.19B for syringomyelia is potentially applicable, and it requires
“[d]isorganization of motor function as described in 11.04B.”  20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.
P, App. 1.  Listing 11.04B requires “[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization of motor
function in two extremities, resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous
5movements, or gait and station.”  Id.
The ALJ’s decision reflects adequate consideration of the “disorganization of
motor function” requirement of Listing 11.19B, despite the fact that that specific Listing
is not highlighted.  The ALJ reviewed all of the medical evidence and accurately
concluded from the opinions of Drs. Anthony Frempong-Boadu and Richard Siegfried
that, except for decreased fine finger movements in his left hand and decreased sensation
in his left upper extremity, Scuderi has normal motor, sensory, and reflex functions in the
lower and upper extremities.  The ALJ also noted that Scuderi reports being able to drive
when necessary and perform housekeeping tasks including meal preparation, vacuuming,
and shopping.  Thus, the ALJ found, in a conclusion supported by substantial evidence,
that Scuderi does not have significant and persistent disorganization of motor function in
two or more extremities.  The ALJ’s analysis was sufficient to permit meaningful judicial
review of her conclusion at step three of the sequential analysis.
B. Step Four:  Determination of Residual Functional Capacity
Scuderi also argues that the ALJ did not provide an adequate evidentiary
foundation to support the RFC determination.  The ALJ ultimately determined that
claimant has the [RFC] to lift light objects, such as those weighing up to
twenty pounds, and sit, stand, and walk as needed, but cannot perform more
than occasional reaching, pushing, pulling or tasks requiring feeling with
the left upper extremity and non-dominant hand.  Additionally, as the result
of his medication, the claimant is unable to engage in complex or detailed
tasks on a sustained basis.  
(A-21.)
6In Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981), we held that an ALJ must
discuss not only the evidence that supports his or her decision, but also the evidence that
was rejected.  The ALJ did so here.  She analyzed the opinions of Scuderi’s treating
physicians, Drs. Frempong-Boadu, Siegfried, Motz, and Spinapolice, and the opinion of
Dr. Weber, a physician who examined Scuderi on behalf of New Jersey’s Disability
Determination Services (“DDS”).  Her ultimate conclusion is consistent with the opinions
of Drs. Frempong-Boadu and Weber.  Dr. Frempong-Boadu recommended that Scuderi
avoid all heavy lifting and any work requiring the use of fine finger movements with his
left hand.  Dr. Weber found that Scuderi cannot do heavy lifting, is limited in his ability
to push and pull with his upper extremities and in his abilities to reach and feel, and
should avoid hazards due to limitations in his ability to balance.  Another assessment
from an unidentified DDS physician reports similar limitations.  All of these limitations
and conditions were taken into account in the ALJ’s RFC determination.
To be sure, the ALJ’s RFC determination is inconsistent with the reports of Dr.
Motz and Scuderi’s own statements about how his impairment affects his abilities.  The
ALJ explained, however, why she rejected these reports in favor of the reports by Drs.
Frempong-Boadu and Weber, as required by Cotter.  In addition to the limitations found
by Drs. Frempong-Boadu and Weber, Dr. Motz found that Scuderi had a complete
inability to balance and a limitation on his ability to stand or walk more than 15 feet.  The
ALJ explained that she placed less reliance on Dr. Motz’s opinion because Dr. Motz
7“provided no specifics with respect to the degree of limitations imposed.”  (A-22, see
Motz’s RFC report at A-258-61.)  Indeed, Dr. Motz’s report provides little detail about
Scuderi’s impairments and stated that it was “unknown” how many pounds Scuderi would
be able to lift or carry and how many hours Scuderi would be able to stand or walk in an
8-hour work day.  The ALJ also explained that, based on Scuderi’s continued activity
level, his statements concerning the intensity, duration, and limiting effects of his
impairments were not entirely credible. 
Scuderi argues, for the first time, that the ALJ did not give adequate consideration
to his complaints of pain.  The ALJ’s decision, however, specifically discussed treatment
records from Ronald Spinapolice, D.O., a pain management specialist, whose most recent
progress notes from 2005 state that Scuderi was “doing well [and] offers no complaints,
with good pain relief” from the medications.  (A-293.)  The ALJ took Scuderi’s pain into
account in her RFC determination when she recognized Scuderi’s need for constant pain
medication and found that, due to the medication’s side effects, he cannot engage in
complex or detailed tasks on a sustained basis. 
C. Step Five:  Availability of Jobs in the National Economy
Finally, Scuderi argues that the ALJ erred at step five of the analysis when she
relied on testimony from the vocational expert that, he alleges, was given in response to
hypotheticals not corresponding to the RFC determination eventually reached by the ALJ. 
Several hypotheticals were posed to the vocational expert by both the ALJ and by counsel
       Although Scuderi argues to the contrary, the ALJ did make clear which hypothetical3
she was relying on because she stated in her decision that, in response to the hypothetical,
the vocational expert answered that the person would be able to perform the requirements
of the “Marker” occupation, DOT 209.587-034.  Review of the transcript indicates that
the vocational expert gave “Marker” as an answer to only one hypothetical.
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for Scuderi, but the hypothetical relied on by the ALJ  involved a person who could do3
light work, with no frequent push-pull with the upper extremities, no ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, only occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, and crawling, no frequent fine fingering, and no hazards.  The vocational
expert responded that a person with this RFC could work as a Marker, DOT 209.587-034,
or as a Sales Attendant, DOT 299.677-010.   The ALJ thereafter confirmed that this
hypothetical person would be employable provided that he could concentrate at a simple
level, and if he could not do so, he would not be employable. 
This hypothetical compares favorably with the ALJ’s ultimate RFC determination
that 
claimant has the [RFC] to lift light objects, such as those weighing up to
twenty pounds, and sit, stand, and walk as needed, but cannot perform more
than occasional reaching, pushing, pulling or tasks requiring feeling with
the left upper extremity and non-dominant hand.  Additionally, as the result
of his medication, the claimant is unable to engage in complex or detailed
tasks on a sustained basis.  
(A-21.)  While the hypothetical did not take into consideration the effect of Scuderi’s pain
medication on his ability to do work-related activities, the ALJ did follow up on the
hypothetical to include consideration of Scuderi’s ability to concentrate at a simple level. 
9Therefore, the ALJ did not err when she relied on the vocational expert’s testimony in
response to this hypothetical. 
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the decision of the District Court
affirming the decision of the Commissioner.
